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FREE SPEECH AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
Floyd Abrams* 
INTRODUCTION 
Much of the development of First Amendment law in the United States 
has occurred as a result of American courts rejecting well-established 
principles of English law.  The U.S. Supreme Court has frequently rejected 
English law, permitting far more public criticism of the judiciary than 
would be countenanced in England, rejecting English libel law as being 
insufficiently protective of freedom of expression1 and holding that even 
hateful speech directed at minorities receives the highest level of 
constitutional protection.2  The Second Circuit has played a major role in 
the movement away from the strictures of the law as it existed in the mother 
country.  In some areas, dealing with the clash between claims of national 
security and freedom of expression, the Second Circuit predated the 
Supreme Court’s protective First Amendment rulings.  In others, dealing 
with claims of obscenity contained in literature, the Second Circuit moved 
down a path of free speech protection long before English courts did so.  In 
still others, including libel, the Second Circuit followed Supreme Court 
rulings that had long since departed from English law in a variety of 
circumstances. 
I.  FREE SPEECH CASES 
Few First Amendment cases are as difficult as those that arise when 
national security is cited as a basis for restricting speech.  Frequently, 
efforts to limit or punish speech arise at times of genuine national 
emergency—during wartime or times when the safety of the nation is at 
risk.  Often, the dangers of the speech at issue are greatly exaggerated or 
overstated by the governmental entity seeking to limit or punish that 
speech.  The Second Circuit has had a number of such cases in which it was 
obliged to articulate legal standards by which it adjudged when, if at all, 
speech could be abridged.  This Article deals briefly with two such cases:  
one that arose during World War I and another that arose toward the 
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 1. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 2. See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
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beginning of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.3  Judge Learned Hand played a significant role in both cases.  This 
Article then turns to the role of the Second Circuit in the Pentagon Papers 
Case. 
In the summer of 1917, U.S. Postmaster General Albert Burleson barred 
the mailing of The Masses, a monthly antiestablishment publication that 
dealt with the arts and politics and which was strongly against American 
participation in World War I.4  The decision was rooted in the proposition 
that the publication’s cartoons and text violated the Espionage Act by 
causing or seeking to cause “insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal 
of duty in the military or naval forces.”5  The case was assigned to then-
District Court Judge Learned Hand, who wrote what Professor Geoffrey R. 
Stone has characterized as “[b]y far the most important decision in which a 
federal district judge held fast against a broad construction of the Espionage 
Act.”6  In Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,7 Judge Hand acknowledged that 
during wartime, Congress might be empowered to “forbid the mails to 
[circulate] any matter which tends to discourage the successful prosecution 
of the war.”8  Judge Hand then urged that it was necessary, even in 
wartime, to limit the scope of a broadly phrased Espionage Act so that it 
could not be read to justify “the suppression of all hostile criticism, and of 
all opinion except what encouraged and supported the existing policies.”9  
He sought to accomplish that goal by narrowly construing the concept of 
incitement. In language much quoted through the years, he offered the 
following test: 
If one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest 
to resist the law, it seems to me one should not be held to have attempted 
to cause its violation.  If that be not the test, I can see no escape from the 
conclusion that under this section every political agitation which can be 
shown to be apt to create a seditious temper is illegal.  I am confident that 
by such language Congress had no such revolutionary purpose in view.10 
The Second Circuit, in an opinion of Judge Henry Wade Rogers, 
reversed, holding that the determination of the Postmaster General violated 
neither the First nor Fifth Amendments since the magazine’s contents could 
be interpreted to encourage efforts to frustrate military recruitment during 
time of war.11  “The article, taken as a whole,” Judge Rogers wrote, “may 
well be regarded as intended to encourage objectors to be as steadfast 
protestors against ‘government tyranny’ as their English comrades.  In other 
 
 3. See generally United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950); Masses Publ’g 
Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). 
 4. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND:  THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 151 (1994). 
 5. Masses, 246 F. at 26. 
 6. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES:  FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 164 (2004). 
 7. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). 
 8. Id. at 538. 
 9. Id. at 539. 
 10. Id. at 540. 
 11. Masses, 246 F. at 38. 
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words, it is an encouragement to disobey the law.”12  As for Judge Hand’s 
conclusion that the advocacy of the magazine was insufficiently direct to 
constitute a violation of law, the opinion was dismissive, “[t]hat one may 
willfully obstruct the enlistment service, without advising in direct language 
against enlistments, and without stating that to refrain from enlistment is a 
duty or in one’s interest, seems to us too plain for controversy.”13  “[I]t is 
not necessary,” Judge Rogers concluded, “that an incitement to crime must 
be direct.”14 
Thirty-three years later, the Second Circuit again was confronted with a 
case that required it to deal with conflicting claims of danger to national 
security and the need to preserve individual liberty in United States v. 
Dennis.15  In 1948, twelve leaders of the Communist Party were indicted 
and convicted of conspiring to advocate the overthrow of the U.S. 
government.  Judge Learned Hand wrote the opinion for the Second Circuit 
affirming the convictions, including one that led him to receive a good deal 
of rare criticism from many who viewed him as among the greatest jurists 
in American history.  Some of the criticism focused on Judge Hand’s 
recharacterization of the clear and present danger test as, “[i]n each case 
[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its 
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid 
the danger.”16  The Supreme Court adopted this reformulation in its 
affirmance of the ruling and has occasionally repeated it.  But, the 
characterization remains controversial and is viewed by critics as a major 
step away from vigorous First Amendment protection.  Judge Richard 
Posner has characterized the test as akin to “better safe than sorry,” 
observing that such an approach is “not a plausible theory of the First 
Amendment” and that “we might expect of a judge of Hand’s ability 
something more than the conventional wisdom of his time and place.”17 
Judge Hand’s treatment in Dennis of the issues he had considered so 
many years before in the Masses case has also been a topic of continuing 
controversy.  He concluded in Dennis that even if he had applied his own 
test in Masses, the Dennis convictions would still be upheld.18  Noting that 
the defendants’ efforts to “persuade others of the aims of Communism 
would have been protected,” he concluded that First Amendment protection 
would ultimately be overcome since the defendants’ speech was “coupled 
with . . . the advocacy of illegal means.”19  Since the defendants had called 
for force and violence to overthrow the government “when a propitious 
 
 12. Id. at 36. 
 13. Id. at 38. 
 14. Id. 
 15. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950). 
 16. Id. at 212. 
 17. Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial 
Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 511, 517–18 (1994). 
 18. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201. 
 19. Id. at 207. 
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occasion will arise,” such speech was not protected by the First 
Amendment.20 
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling by a 6–2 vote, with Chief Justice 
Fred Vinson’s majority opinion adopting much of Judge Hand’s analysis.21 
Dissenting opinions of Justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas were 
particularly impassioned.  The former vociferously objected to the 
transformation of the clear and present danger test to the Chief Justice’s 
Hand-rooted opinion,22 and Justice Douglas argued that there was hardly 
any “present” danger from the “miserable merchants of unwanted ideas” of 
the defendants.23 
The role of the Second Circuit in United States v. New York Times Co.,24 
(“the Pentagon Papers case”) has been little remembered in light of the 
ultimate decision of the Supreme Court in the case, but it is worth recalling.  
The case was commenced by the United States seeking an order from the 
district court to enjoin the New York Times from publishing portions of a 
top secret study conducted by the Department of Defense during the 
ongoing conflict in Vietnam.25  The study, over 7,000 pages in length, was 
historical in nature, tracing the development of American involvement in 
Vietnam from the presidency of Harry S. Truman through 1968, three years 
before the litigation.26  It had been provided to the Times by a confidential 
source (later identified as Daniel Ellsburg) who was one of the study’s 
authors.  The case proceeded at what may be viewed as juridical warp 
speed.  The district judge, Murray I. Gurfein, initially granted a temporary 
restraining order.  A few days later, he conducted a hearing with witnesses 
who addressed the issue of the supposed harm to national security if 
publication were not enjoined and then rendered a decision in favor of the 
Times on June 19, 1971, rejecting the government’s demand for a 
continuing prior restraint on the newspaper.  Three days later, oral argument 
was held in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting—unprecedentedly, 
it appears—en banc, without the case having been heard previously by a 
three-judge panel.27 
While a number of jurists asked questions of counsel, the most 
memorable exchange occurred at the very beginning of the oral argument of 
Yale Professor Alexander Bickel, who represented the Times.28  Judge 
Henry Friendly’s questions to Bickel were brutal.29  Bickel had commenced 
his argument by asserting that there was “no evidence anywhere in the 
record, certainly not, that the Times stole [these] documents or that anyone 
 
 20. Id. at 206. 
 21. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 22. Id. at 580 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 23. Id. at 589 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 24. 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), rev’d, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
 25. FLOYD ABRAMS, SPEAKING FREELY:  TRIALS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6–31 (2005). 
 26. Id. 
 27. DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY:  GREATEST JUDGE OF HIS ERA 153 (2012). 
 28. Id. at 154. 
 29. Id. 
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stole them.”30  That was true enough but hardly what the case or its appeal 
was about.  This is what happened next: 
Judge Friendly:  You know that someone gave them to the Times when he 
had no authority to do it, though? 
Mr. Bickel:  That is the allegation, your Honor.  But how he got them— 
Judge Friendly:  Is there the slightest doubt about that? 
Judge Kaufman:  You have not denied that, have you? 
Mr. Bickel:  We have not denied that the Times did not get the documents 
from a government source authorized— 
Judge Friendly:  Why not say the answer is the Times got them without 
authorization? . . .  Why don’t you face the facts? 
Mr. Bickel:  I am simply resisting the word ‘stolen,’ which it does seem to 
me is a highly colored word. 
Judge Friendly:  Let’s say they received the goods in the process of 
embezzlement, then, if you prefer. 
Mr. Bickel:  Without dwelling further on the point, may I say I resist that 
as well? 
Judge Friendly:  You may resist it.31 
The argument that followed got no worse for the Times but little better.  
Two days later, on June 23, 1971, the Second Circuit, by a 5–3 vote, issued 
a one sentence per curiam opinion remanding the case to the district court 
for further factual hearings, a distinct victory for the government.32  The 
Times’s petition for a writ of certiorari was granted and oral argument 
quickly followed.33  On June 30, fifteen days after the case began, the 
Court, by a 6–3 vote, concluded that the government had failed to meet its 
heavy burden to sustain a prior restraint and ruled in favor of the Times, as 
well as the Washington Post, which had been engaged in its own battle with 
the government over its right to publish portions of the Pentagon Papers.34  
The Second Circuit’s order was reversed.35 
II.  OBSCENITY AND FREE SPEECH 
In 1868, the English case of Regina v. Hicklin,36 set forth the law that 
governed that nation well into the twentieth century.  Obscene speech was 
defined as that which had a tendency to morally corrupt the young or those 
who were otherwise “susceptible” to being corrupted.  That test was applied 
in the United States as well, at least until the memorable case of United 
States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses,37 which remains probably the most 
publicized obscenity case in American history.  The book Ulysses by James 
Joyce had been seized by customs authorities, who were empowered by the 
Tariff Act of 1930 to seize “any obscene book, pamphlet, paper, writing,” 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 154–55. 
 32. Id. at 157. 
 33. Id. at 160. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  The author of this Article was cocounsel to the New York Times in this case. See 
ABRAMS, supra note 25, at 1–31. 
 36. [1868] 3 QB 360 (Eng.). 
 37. 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff’d, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). 
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or the like, sought to be imported into the United States.38  The book had 
already been held to be obscene in earlier proceedings in state court, but 
when the case came before Judge James Woolsey, sitting in the Southern 
District of New York, he concluded that the correct legal test for obscenity 
was whether a book tended “to stir the sex impulses or to lead to sexually 
impure and lustful thoughts.”39  Judge Woolsey concluded “[this type of 
language] did not tend to excite sexual impulses or lustful 
thoughts . . . [because] its net effect . . . was only that of a somewhat tragic 
and very powerful commentary on the inner lives of men and women.”40  
Judge Woolsey’s opinion, later published as a sort of forward to the book 
itself, stated that the book lacked the “leer of the sensualist” and that, 
although some of the language of the characters was voiced in “old Saxon 
words . . . [i]n respect of the recurrent emergence of the theme of sex in the 
mind of [Joyce’s] characters, it must always be remembered that [Joyce’s] 
locale was Celtic and his season spring.”41 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the decision in a 1934 opinion by 
Judge Augustus Hand, joined by his cousin, Judge Learned Hand, with a 
dissent by Judge Martin Manton.42  The opinion, though far less well 
known historically than Judge Woolsey’s much quoted tribute to Joyce, is 
well worth recalling. 
Judge Augustus Hand’s opinion about the book was a bit more sardonic 
than Judge Woolsey’s.  Although Judge Hand noted that “[w]e may 
discount the laudation of Ulysses by some of its admirers and reject the 
view that it will permanently stand among the great works of literature,”43 
he was still highly appreciative of the book’s “originality and sincerity of 
treatment”44 and its “beauty and undoubted distinction.”45  These views 
plainly affected Judge Hand’s ultimate conclusion that, while passages of 
the book were “obscene under any fair definition,” they were “relevant to 
the purpose of depicting the thoughts of the characters and are introduced to 
give meaning to the whole, rather than to promote lust or portray filth for its 
own sake.”46  The court concluded that, taken as a whole, the book was “not 
pornographic, and while in not a few spots it is coarse, blasphemous, and 
obscene, it does not, in our opinion tend to promote lust.”47  In deciding that 
issue, Judge Hand held that courts must view books as a whole rather than 
simply focusing on challenged portions (as dissenting Judge Manton had at 
some length).48  The court held that the analysis must consider the effect on 
 
 38. 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (2012). 
 39. Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. at 184. 
 40. Id. at 185. 
 41. Id. at 183–84. 
 42. Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705. 
 43. Id. at 706. 
 44. Id. at 708. 
 45. Id. at 706. 
 46. Id. at 706–07. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 706. 
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average persons, rather than focusing only on the most sensitive people.49  
Furthermore, the impact on society of overzealous censorship must be 
borne in mind: 
Art certainly cannot advance under compulsion to traditional forms, and 
nothing in such a field is more stifling to progress than limitation of the 
right to experiment with a new technique.  The foolish judgments of Lord 
Eldon about one hundred years ago, proscribing the works of Byron and 
Southey, and the finding by the jury under a charge by Lord Denman that 
the publication of Shelley’s “Queen Mab” was an indictable offense are a 
warning to us all who have to determine the limits of the field within 
which authors may exercise themselves.  We think that Ulysses is a book 
of originality and sincerity of treatment and that it has not the effect of 
promoting lust.  Accordingly, it does not fall within the statute, even 
though it may justly offend many.50 
Judge Manton’s dissent offered an entirely different view, maintaining 
that even if sexually graphic material was objectionable to only a narrow 
slice of the public, it could still be banned in light of the potential effect of 
the book upon the “average less sophisticated member[s] of society, not to 
mention the adolescent[s].”51 
A few aspects of the Second Circuit’s Ulysses ruling are worthy of 
special note.  The opinion was not couched as a First Amendment opinion, 
but rather as one interpreting the congressional statute at issue.  Not until 
later in the twentieth century were charges of obscenity assessed under First 
Amendment standards.  This opinion, however, has been credited with 
being the first to deviate from the far-less speech-protective principles of 
English law.  On a more amusing level, it is difficult not to notice that the 
Hand opinion paid as little attention to Judge Woolsey’s celebrated opinion 
as possible, quoting two brief and truncated passages from it in the first 
paragraph and making not the slightest reference to it thereafter.  Professor 
Gerald Gunther, in his biography of Learned Hand, noted that the Hands 
made a point of drafting their opinion so that it contained “not a single 
quotable line” that might fuel what they viewed as the media circus 
surrounding the case, further stoked, in their view, by Judge Woolsey’s all-
too-quotable opinion.52 
Not long after the court’s ruling in Ulysses, the same panel considered 
another obscenity case.  In United States v. Levine,53 the Second Circuit 
considered an appeal from a conviction of an individual charged with 
distributing obscene circulars for obscene books that no one would compare 
with Joyce’s work.54  Referring back to the court’s ruling in Ulysses two 
years before, Judge Learned Hand observed that in such a case 
 
 49. See id. at 711. 
 50. Id. at 708–09. 
 51. Id. at 711 (Manton, J., dissenting). 
 52. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 338–39. 
 53. 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936). 
 54. See id.  
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the work must be taken as a whole, its merits weighed against its 
defects . . . ; if it is old, its accepted place in the arts must be regarded; if 
new, the opinions of competent critics in published reviews or the like 
may be considered; what counts is its effect, not upon any particular class, 
but upon all those whom it is likely to reach.  Thus ‘obscenity’ is a 
function of many variables, and the verdict of the jury is not the 
conclusion of a syllogism of which they are to find only the minor 
premise but really a small bit of legislation ad hoc, like the standard of 
care.55 
Notably, Judge Augustus Hand, the author of the Ulysees ruling, dissented 
from the majority opinion. 
More recent obscenity cases that are rooted in the First Amendment 
provide far more protection; few provide the pleasure one receives in 
reading so thoughtful an opinion. 
III.  LIBEL LAW 
With the issuance of the landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan,56 the Supreme Court effectively rejected English libel law that had 
been applied as American law in every state in the nation.57  It did so by 
essentially constitutionalizing libel law, providing novel protections for 
speech about public officials (which was later expanded to public figures).58  
In such cases, the burden of proving falsity shifts to the plaintiff and even 
false statements are protected if made without actual knowledge of falsity 
or serious doubts about truth or falsity.59  The latter test, mischaracterized 
by the Court as “actual malice,” notwithstanding that it has nothing to do 
with malice at all, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.60  But 
what happens when a publication publishes an article that contains a 
newsworthy, but false and defamatory charge, by one public figure about 
another?  For all the protections afforded to the New York Times, which are 
designed to protect “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate, one type 
of speech not protected is a false statement of fact voiced with knowledge 
of its falsity or serious doubts of its truth.61  In fact, the moment a journalist 
testifies that she wrote something knowing or suspecting that it was untrue, 
the New York Times’s protection evaporates.  But does the newsworthiness 
of the false charge provide any protection for the journalist?  That was the 
issue in Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.62 
The Edwards litigation originated out of the heated debate over the use of 
the insecticide DDT.63  Officials of the National Audubon Society were 
 
 55. Id. at 157. 
 56. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 279. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. at 279–83. 
 61. Id. at 270. 
 62. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).  The author of this 
Article was counsel for defendant-appellee New York Times Co. in this case. 
 63. See id. at 115. 
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concerned that pro-DDT scientists, who had financial relationships with the 
chemical industry, were minimizing the possible impact of DDT by 
distorting figures about the number of birds that were harmed by the 
pesticide.64  An editorial in an Audubon publication asserted that any 
scientist who did so was “being paid to lie, or is parroting something he 
knows little about.”65  A New York Times reporter called the Audubon 
Society and asked for the names of the “paid liars.”66  An Audubon 
employee called that reporter back and furnished five names.  The reporter 
reached three of the five scientists, all of whom denied the charge.67  The 
New York Times published an article summarizing the charges and stating 
that the accused scientists had “ridiculed the accusations” as “hysterical,” 
“unfounded,” and “almost libelous.”68  The scientists commenced a libel 
action. 
The district court held that the scientists were public figures, and, basing 
his ruling on New York Times, Judge Charles Metzner refused to set aside a 
judgment reached by a jury against the defendants.69  The judgment, the 
court held, could stand so long as the reporter “had serious doubts about the 
truth of the statement that the appellees were paid liars, even if he did not 
have any doubt that he was reporting [Audubon’s] allegations faithfully.”70 
The Second Circuit reversed.71  In an opinion of then-Chief Judge Irving 
Kaufman, the Court concluded that 
when a responsible, prominent organization like the National Audubon 
Society makes serious charges against a public figure, the First 
Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested reporting of those 
charges, regardless of the reporter’s private views regarding their validity.  
What is newsworthy about such accusations is that they were made.  We 
do not believe that the press may be required under the First Amendment 
to suppress newsworthy statements merely because it has serious doubts 
regarding their truth.72 
The court went on to note that “[l]iteral accuracy is not a prerequisite,” but 
that the “journalist believe[d], reasonably and in good faith, that his report 
accurately convey[ed] the charges made.”73 
Edwards’s articulation of a neutral reportage privilege was controversial 
when adopted and remains so today.  It has thus far been adopted in a 
minority of circuits and state courts.  New York, for example, has not 
 
 64. See id. at 115–16. 
 65. See id. at 117. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. at 117–18. 
 68. Id. at 118. 
 69. Edwards v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev’d, 
556 F.2d 113. 
 70. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 119. 
 71. See id. at 122–23. 
 72. Id. at 120 (citations omitted). 
 73. Id. 
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adopted it, leading to substantively different bodies of libel law being 
applied in state and federal courts in the same state.74 
The Supreme Court has yet to opine on the privilege, although in Harte-
Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,75 the issue was addressed in 
a concurring opinion of Justice Harry Blackmun.76  In that case, the district 
court had rejected a neutral reportage privilege on the ground that the 
original defamer was an individual rather than a “responsible, prominent” 
organization.77  Unfortunately, the newspaper did not raise the issue on 
appeal to the Sixth Circuit or to the Supreme Court.  Justice Blackmun’s 
concurring opinion observed that the defendant’s choice not to rely on the 
privilege “appears to have been unwise . . . .  Were this Court to adopt the 
neutral reportage theory, the facts of this case might fit within it.”78 
In Herbert v. Lando,79 the Second Circuit made sweeping statements 
about the First Amendment protections afforded to journalists facing a 
defamation action brought by a public figure.80  Although ultimately 
reversed by the Supreme Court, then-Chief Judge Kaufman’s statements 
about the editorial privilege are nevertheless noteworthy due to their broad 
scope.  The plaintiff in that action, retired Army officer Anthony Herbert, 
had alleged that CBS program producer Barry Lando and program anchor 
Mike Wallace defamed him when 60 Minutes aired allegations that Herbert 
had fictitiously reported war crimes during the Vietnam War.81  During 
discovery, Herbert attempted to compel disclosure of materials pertaining to 
Lando’s state of mind as he prepared the alleged defamatory program—
specifically while researching Herbert’s claims of war crimes, having 
certain conversations with Wallace, and deciding whether or not to include 
certain materials in the program.82  Purporting to apply Sullivan and its 
progeny, Judge Charles Haight, in the Southern District of New York, 
granted Herbert’s motion to compel and rejected Lando’s contention that 
the First Amendment barred inquiry into his editorial state of mind.83  Judge 
Haight characterized Lando’s state of mind as “of central importance to a 
proper resolution of the merits,” and likely to lead—either directly or 
indirectly—to admissible evidence.84 
The Second Circuit, in an opinion by then-Chief Judge Kaufman, 
reversed the Southern District and denied Herbert’s motion to compel.85  
The court recognized that the First Amendment affords “privilege to 
 
 74. Compare id., with Hogan v. Herald Co., 446 N.Y.S.2d 836 (App. Div.), aff’d, 444 
N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1982). 
 75. 491 U.S. 657 (1989). 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. at 660 n.1. 
 78. Id. at 694–95 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 79. 568 F.2d 974 (1977), rev’d, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). 
 80. Id.  The author of this Article represented defendants-appellants Barry Lando, Mike 
Wallace, and CBS Inc. in this action. 
 81. See id. at 980. 
 82. See id. at 980–82. 
 83. See generally Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
 84. Id. at 395. 
 85. See Herbert, 568 F.2d 974. 
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disclosure of a journalist’s exercise of editorial control and judgment,” and 
found that freedom from such probing was necessary to maintain “a free 
and untrammeled press.”86  Indeed, the views, conclusions, and iterative 
process that Herbert sought to scrutinize involved “human judgment,” 
which the court described as “the lifeblood of the editorial process.”87  
Judge Thomas Meskill dissented and would have held that the actual malice 
standard imposed by the Court in Sullivan required, as a “major purpose” of 
Herbert’s lawsuit, “to expose the defendants’ subjective state of mind.”88 
Recognizing the importance of the issue, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and ultimately reversed the Second Circuit, by a vote of 6–3.89  
According to Justice Byron White’s majority opinion, the journalist 
editorial privilege was the sort of qualified privilege that was trumped 
when, as in the case before the Court, the required showing (actual malice) 
hinged on a showing that the defendant journalist acted with an improper 
motive.90  The Court held that the Second Circuit’s view of the privilege 
“would substantially enhance the burden of proving actual malice”—to the 
point that it would make it virtually impossible for public figure plaintiffs to 
pursue libel actions—and would therefore be in violation of Sullivan and 
other cases that came before it.91  The Court remanded the case for further 
proceedings.92 
Discovery recommenced following the Supreme Court’s decision, with 
Wallace, Lando, and CBS compelled to produce the editorial process 
material.  Following closure of discovery in September of 1982, the 
defendants all moved for summary judgment.  Judge Haight granted 
summary judgment for defendants Lando, Wallace, and CBS on nine of the 
eleven alleged defamatory statements because they were not made with 
“actual malice” under the Sullivan standard.93  The defendants subsequently 
moved to dismiss the two statements that Judge Haight deemed actionable 
but were denied.94  They appealed the denial of the motion to dismiss and 
the motion for summary judgment for the two remaining statements.95 
The Second Circuit, in a unanimous opinion by Judge Kaufman, agreed 
with the defendants’ position that the two remaining statements were not 
actionable and ordered dismissal of both.96  According to the court, the 
remaining nine actionable statements, combined with other materials 
accessible to the defendants during production of their show, had given 
them sufficient grounds to support the two conclusory statements that 
 
 86. Id. at 975. 
 87. Id. at 983–84. 
 88. Id. at 995 (Meskill, J., dissenting). 
 89. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 158 (1979). 
 90. Id. at 163–65. 
 91. Id. at 169. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See generally Herbert v. Lando, 596 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 94. See Herbert, 781 F.2d at 304. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 298. 
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remained at issue.97  The opinion further held that because the defendants’ 
published view that Herbert had lied about reporting war crimes was not 
actionable, other statements that merely (1) implied that same view, (2) 
were outgrowths of the view, or (3) were subsidiary to that view, were also 
not deemed actionable.98  As Judge Kaufman colorfully explained, “[f]or 
Herbert to base his defamation action on subsidiary statements whose 
ultimate defamatory implications are themselves not actionable . . . would 
be a classic case of the tail wagging the dog.”99  Herbert’s petition for writ 
of certiorari was denied.100 
In the decades that followed, the Second Circuit has continued to issue 
impactful opinions in the area of libel law.  Two recent libel opinions—both 
authored by Judge Richard Wesley—warrant mention here for their 
protection of the press’s First Amendment rights.  The first of these two 
cases, Chau v. Lewis,101 involved libel claims based on Michael Lewis’s 
2010 bestselling book, “The Big Short,” and attracted significant media 
attention due to its prominent subject matter.102  The book, which examined 
the causes of the global financial crisis that occurred just a few years earlier, 
contained statements about a money manager named Wing Chau and his 
business, Harding Advisory.103  Chau sued Lewis, his source, Steve 
Eisman, and the book’s publisher, W.W. Norton, for libel, alleging twenty-
six defamatory statements.104  Judge Wesley’s November 2014 opinion, 
which was joined by Senior Judge Amalya Kearse, affirmed the decision of 
the Southern District of New York and granted the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment on all twenty-six counts.105  The thrust of Chau’s 
complaint was that the book portrayed him as a villain by recounting a 2007 
conversation between Chau and Eisman and alleging that he created 
unwarranted demand for risky subprime bonds that ultimately failed.106 
Judge Wesley, agreeing largely with the original ruling of District Judge 
George Daniels, found that not a single one of the challenged statements 
could reasonably be perceived as defamatory.107  According to Judge 
Wesley: 
The market events of 2008 and 2009 may undoubtedly influence one’s 
perception as to whether going long on CDO’s meant Chau was a fool, or 
Chau was a rube, or his motivations were avarice; but hindsight cannot 
give such opinions a defamatory meaning.  Lewis’s various implications 
that Chau was wrong about the mortgage market are not actionable. 
 
 97. See id. at 311. 
 98. See id. at 312. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Herbert v. Lando, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986). 
 101. 771 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. at 121–26. 
 104. See id. at 122. 
 105. See id. at 132. 
 106. See id. at 122. 
 107. See id. 
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The law of defamation in New York is predicated on the free exchange of 
ideas and viewpoints.  The marketplace can wound one’s pride—for 
words can offend or insult—but simple slights are not the stuff of 
defamation.108 
Since the challenged statements were not, in the court’s view, “reasonably 
susceptible of a defamatory connotation,” no reasonable jury could find for 
Chau and the case had to be dismissed.109  Senior Judge Ralph Winter 
dissented on the grounds that a jury could have relied on the challenged 
statements to find Chau liable for civil or criminal securities fraud.110 
A few months later in Martin v. Hearst Corp.,111 a three-judge panel for 
the Second Circuit unanimously refused to construe Connecticut’s criminal 
erasure statute to require removal or modification of news articles 
concerning the arrest of an individual whose arrest was subsequently erased 
from government records pursuant to that law.112  Lorraine Martin, a 
Connecticut nurse whose arrest for drug-related offenses had been 
expunged, had sought removal of news stories about the arrest after the 
stories made it difficult for her to find employment.113  The court affirmed a 
decision of the District of Connecticut, granted the Hearst Corporation’s 
motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the plaintiff’s action for 
libel.114  In another opinion penned by Judge Wesley, the court found that 
the historical fact of the individual’s arrest remained true even though, 
under the statute, the plaintiff whose charges were annulled “shall be 
deemed to have never been arrested.”115  Judge Wesley explained: 
The statute creates legal fictions, but it does not and cannot undo 
historical facts or convert once-true facts into falsehoods. . . .  [T]he 
statute does not render historically accurate news accounts of an arrest 
tortious merely because the defendant is later deemed as a matter of legal 
fiction never to have been arrested.116 
Senior Judge John Walker and Judge Dennis Jacobs both joined Judge 
Wesley’s opinion.117 
Although the court’s opinion made no specific mention of the First 
Amendment, it necessarily implies that any legislative attempt to so extend 
the Connecticut’s criminal erasure statute would be at odds with free speech 
principles by imposing liability for nonfalse protected speech.  The Hearst 
opinion also warrants attention for its contribution to the debate on whether 
the United States should follow the example of the European Union and 
recognize a “right to be forgotten.”  The ruling makes plain that there is no 
such right in the United States, even where the individual’s record is 
 
 108. Id. at 131. 
 109. Id. at 132 (quoting Davis v. Ross, 754 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
 110. See id. (Winter, J., dissenting). 
 111. 777 F.3d 546 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id. at 549. 
 114. See id. at 548. 
 115. Id. (quoting Conn. Gen. Stat. § 542-142a(e)(3)). 
 116. Id. at 551. 
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expunged.118  Debate over whether, in the Age of the Internet, the United 
States should or constitutionally could recognize such a right will 
undoubtedly continue. 
IV.  PANHANDLING AS SPEECH 
Some of the most interesting appellate rulings are ones in which a court 
all but reverses itself without quite saying it is doing so.  For example, 
within a three-year period, commencing in 1990, the Second Circuit did so 
when addressing what sort of First Amendment protection beggars receive. 
In Young v. New York City Transit Authority,119  the Second Circuit 
addressed the question of whether the prohibition of begging and 
panhandling within the New York City subway system violated the First 
Amendment.120  The Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) submitted 
evidence designed to show that begging on subway trains “contributes to a 
public perception that the subway is fraught with hazard and danger” and 
that “two-thirds of the subway ridership have been intimidated into giving 
money to beggars.”121  Holding that begging was not protected in the 
subways, the court determined that the regulation was not directed at speech 
itself, that it was justified by content-neutral governmental interests 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and that the New York City 
law banning such activity was constitutional.122  Judge Frank Altimari 
observed that “[c]ommon sense tells us that begging is much more 
‘conduct’ than it is ‘speech.’”123  He summarized the nature of begging as 
follows: 
The only message that we are able to espy as common to all acts of 
begging is that beggars want to exact money from those whom they 
accost.  While we acknowledge that passengers generally understand this 
generic message, we think it falls far outside the scope of protected 
speech under the First Amendment.124 
Three years later, the Second Circuit took another look at the issue in a 
somewhat different context.  In Loper v. New York City Police 
Department,125 the Second Circuit considered the constitutionality of a New 
York City Penal Law that barred “loitering,” defined in the law as the 
conduct of one who “[l]oiters, remains or wanders about in a public place 
for the purpose of begging.”126  City sidewalks, the court concluded, “fall 
 
 118. See, e.g., Alison Frankel, No ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Even If Record Is Expunged:  
2nd Circuit, REUTERS (Jan. 28, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/01/28/ 
no-right-to-be-forgotten-even-if-record-is-expunged-2nd-circuit/ [https://perma.cc/X82V-
KUUK]. 
 119. 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 120. Id.  The author of this Article represented several of the defendants-appellants in this 
action. 
 121. Id. at 149. 
 122. See id. at 164. 
 123. Id. at 153. 
 124. Id. at 154. 
 125. 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 126. Id. (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(1) (McKinney 1980)). 
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into the category of public property traditionally held open to the public for 
expressive activity.”127  Judge Roger Miner characterized begging as 
“usually involv[ing] some communication” of a “social or political” 
nature.128  “Begging,” he wrote, 
frequently is accompanied by speech indicating the need for food, shelter, 
clothing, medical care or transportation. Even without particularized 
speech . . . the presence of an unkempt and disheveled person holding out 
his or her hand or a cup to receive a donation itself conveys a message of 
need for support and assistance.129 
In Young, the court had applied the then-lenient test from United States v. 
O’Brien,130 which looked to whether the government regulation furthered 
an important governmental interest and did so in a manner “no greater than 
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”131  The court found that the 
defendant had easily met the test.132  In Loper, the Court concluded that, 
because begging involved far greater communicative elements than that 
recognized in Young, a far more demanding First Amendment test was 
required.133  Whichever test was applied, Judge Miner concluded, the 
citywide ban on begging at issue in Young violated the First Amendment.134 
In recent cases, other circuits have sided with Loper in light of ever more 
First Amendment protective Supreme Court case law.  In the wake of the 
Court’s 2015 decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,135 which concluded that 
strict scrutiny should be applied when statutes are, on their face, content 
based, the Seventh Circuit concluded in Norton v. Springfield136 that a 
municipal ordinance barring oral panhandling in a downtown historic 
district was content based in light of Reed because it “regulates ‘because of 
the topic discussed.’”137  A similar ruling was reached in Browne v. City of 
Grand Junction,138 in which a city ordinance banning panhandling in 
certain locations and during certain times was deemed content based and 
struck down on summary judgment because the ordinance represented “a 
sledgehammer to a problem that can and should be solved with a 
scalpel.”139 
 
 127. Id. at 704 (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 178–80 (1983)).  The Court 
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 131. Young, 903 F.2d at 157 (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377). 
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 135. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
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V.  COMMERCIAL SPEECH/COMPELLED SPEECH 
Since commercial speech was first held to be protected by the First 
Amendment in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council,140 cases involving such speech—or what was argued to 
be such speech—have frequently come before the Second Circuit.  Issues 
have been heard involving compelled speech in such cases and in others in 
which the context was far less commercial in nature.  This part first 
addresses two decisions by Judge Rosemary Pooler, New York State 
Restaurant Ass’n v. New York City Board of Health141 (NYSRA) and 
Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York,142 involving compelled speech.  In 
the former, arising in a traditional commercial speech context, the court 
upheld a local ordinance requiring certain restaurants to post calorie counts 
on its menus.143  In the latter, arising in a very different context, the court 
struck down local regulations requiring certain disclosures by abortion 
providers about the services they provided and the recommendation that 
patients consult with “licensed” providers.144  This part then summarizes a 
decision of Judge Denny Chin in United States v. Caronia,145 relating to 
FDA-imposed limits on speech of pharmaceutical companies about off-
label uses of their products.146 
A.  New York State Restaurant Association 
In 2006, the New York City Board of Health, under the leadership of 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg, adopted New York City Health Code section 
81.50 (“2006 Regulation 81.50”), which required restaurants that had 
previously released calorie counts to display calorie counts on posted menu 
boards and on the menu itself.147  News of the regulation—the first of its 
kind—received widespread coverage and ignited debates about the role of 
the government in combating the obesity epidemic.148  The 2006 
Regulation 81.50 was struck down by Judge Richard J. Holwell of the 
Southern District of New York following a challenge by the New York 
State Restaurant Association (NYSRA) on both preemption and First 
Amendment grounds.149  Judge Holwell struck down 2006 Regulation 
81.50 on the ground that the Federal Nutrition Labeling Education Act—
 
 140. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 141. 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 142. 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014). 
 143. See generally NYSRA, 556 F.3d 114. 
 144. See generally Evergreen Ass’n, 740 F.3d. 233. 
 145. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 146. See id. 
 147. N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.50 (2006), repealed by N.Y.C., N.Y., 
HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.50 (2015). 
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which applied to nutritional content claims—preempted it.150  Because he 
found it preempted, Judge Holwell did not address NYSRA’s argument that 
the law abridged its members’ First Amendment free speech rights.151  
Notably, the City did not appeal, but rather set out to revise the law—
resulting in the 2008 version of Regulation 81.50. 
In January of 2008, the New York City Board of Health issued a new 
version of Regulation 81.50, aiming to cure the previous preemption 
issues.152  The new version of Regulation 81.50 was different in scope from 
2006 Regulation 81.50:  it required restaurant chains with fifteen or more 
locations to post the calories for each menu item, both on posted menu 
boards and on the menu itself.153  NYSRA again petitioned the Southern 
District to preliminarily enjoin Regulation 81.50’s enforcement and 
ultimately strike it down.154  Once again, NYSRA made two arguments for 
striking down the law:155  First, that the federal statutory scheme that 
regulated the labeling and branding of food—the Nutrition Labeling and 
Education Act of 1990 (NLEA) preempted the ordinance.156  Second, that 
the ordinance violated restaurants’ First Amendment commercial speech 
rights.157 
In April 2008, Judge Holwell rejected both of NYSRA’s arguments and 
denied its motion to preliminary enjoin the ordinance’s enforcement.158  
According to Judge Holwell, the NLEA did not preempt the reformulated 
version of Regulation 81.50 because the voluntary nutritional statements 
trigger was removed.159  Applying rational basis review, Judge Holwell 
found that Regulation 81.50’s calorie-count disclosures—even though an 
underinclusive and piecemeal approach—were “reasonably related” to New 
York City’s interest in reducing obesity.160 
A three-judge panel for the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Holwell’s 
decision in an opinion written by Judge Pooler.161  Regulation 81.50 
survived both preemption and First Amendment challenges.  Regarding 
preemption, the opinion distinguished “nutrition information labeling on 
restaurant food” from “nutrition content claims on restaurant foods”—the 
NLEA preempted the latter, but not the former.162  Because calorie counts 
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are the type of information that appears on a standard nutrition label, calorie 
counts fall into the former category and are not preempted by the NLEA.163 
Regarding the First Amendment issue, Judge Pooler first found that 
calorie count disclosures were commercial speech because they were made 
in connection with a proposed commercial transaction:  the potential 
purchase of a restaurant meal.164  Citing cases from the Supreme Court and 
the Second Circuit, Judge Pooler rejected NYSRA’s argument that 
heightened scrutiny was warranted and concluded that rational basis review 
was appropriate.  First, she cited the Supreme Court’s ruling in Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel165 that “regulations that compel ‘purely 
factual and uncontroversial’ commercial speech are subject to more lenient 
review than regulations that restrict accurate commercial speech.”166  
Second, she cited a previous Second Circuit decision authored by Chief 
Judge Walker—and joined by her and then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor— that 
applied rational basis review to “rules ‘mandating that commercial actors 
disclose commercial information.’”167  Applying rational basis review 
standards, Judge Pooler concluded that “although the restaurants are 
protected by the Constitution when they engage in commercial speech, the 
First Amendment is not violated, where as here, the law in question 
mandates a simple factual disclosure of caloric information and is 
reasonably related to New York City’s goals of combating obesity.”168 
Throughout its journey through the judicial system—and following the 
Second Circuit’s decision—Regulation 81.50 received significant attention.  
The FDA filed an amicus brief urging the Second Circuit to affirm Judge 
Holwell and uphold the law on both the preemption and First Amendment 
questions, calling it rationally related to “a state policy interest in attacking 
obesity among its citizens by making accurate calorie information available 
to consumers.”169  The Southern District and Second Circuit decisions also 
appear to have inspired other states contemplating similar legislation:  in the 
two weeks following the Second Circuit’s February 17, 2009 decision 
upholding the New York City regulation, eight states introduced their own 
calorie-count laws.170  And, in September of 2008, while the case was 
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pending before the Second Circuit, California became the first state to enact 
a calorie-count law.171 
Congress also took note.  Whereas prior legislative attempts at chain 
restaurant labeling had failed, within a month of the Second Circuit’s 
decision, newly proposed legislation on the subject—titled the LEAN 
Act—was before both the House and the Senate.172  Had it been enacted, 
the LEAN Act would have effectively imposed the New York City 
regulation nationwide.173  Despite the LEAN Act’s ultimate failure to be 
adopted—as well as the failure of a rival bill titled the MEAL Act—menu-
labeling legislation was proposed again later that same Congressional year 
(on September 17, 2009) in connection with the controversial Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act174 (PPACA).  The PPACA, along with 
its menu-labeling provisions, ultimately passed both the House and the 
Senate and was signed into law by President Barack Obama on March 23, 
2010—just over a year after the Second Circuit decision.175  Although the 
PPACA went through over 500 amendments between its introduction and 
ultimate enactment, the chain restaurant labeling requirement emerged 
unchanged through the process176 and effectively extended the New York 
City regulation nationwide.177 
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B.  Evergreen Association 
In early 2011, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg signed into 
law Local Law 17, which aimed to regulate pregnancy services centers 
across New York City by compelling them to provide certain information to 
women seeking their services.178  Such centers were often operated by 
groups that opposed abortions, and Local Law 17 followed a finding that 
some of the centers had engaged in deceptive practices.  A group of 
pregnancy services centers sought to enjoin Local Law 17’s enforcement, 
arguing that it infringed on their First Amendment free speech rights.179  
Specifically, the pregnancy services centers challenged Local Law 17’s 
requirement that such centers disclose 
(1) whether or not they have a licensed medical provider on staff . . . (the 
“Status Disclosure”); (2) that “the New York City Department of Health 
and Mental Hygiene encourages women who are or who may be pregnant 
to consult with a licensed provider” (the “Government Message”); and (3) 
whether or not they provide or “provide referrals for abortion,” 
“emergency contraception,” or “prenatal care” (the  “Services 
Disclosure”).180 
In July 2011, Judge William Pauley of the Southern District of New York 
granted the pregnancy services centers’ motion for a preliminary injunction 
in its entirety against Local Law 17, finding that all three disclosure 
requirements violated the First Amendment.181  Finding that the plaintiffs’ 
“speech on reproductive rights concerns an issue prevalent in the public 
discourse” and was therefore not commercial in nature, Judge Pauley 
applied strict scrutiny.182  He struck down Local Law 17 as overinclusive 
on the ground that the required disclosures were not the least restrictive 
means available because they applied to both deceptive and nondeceptive 
speech.183  And he declined to enforce Local Law 17’s nondisclosure 
provisions because the statute’s triggering definition of “pregnancy services 
center” was so vague that it was prone to arbitrary enforcement.184 
The Second Circuit, in a January 17, 2014 opinion, also authored by 
Judge Pooler, affirmed in part and reversed in part.185  Judge Pooler, joined 
in her opinion by Judge Raymond Lohier, rejected the Southern District’s 
finding that “pregnancy services center” was so vaguely defined that the 
statute in its entirety was void and proceeded to consider each disclosure 
separately.186  Applying strict scrutiny and affirming the Southern District, 
the Second Circuit struck down the Government Message and Services 
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Disclosure requirements.187  In a reversal of the Southern District, it upheld 
Local Law 17’s Status Disclosure.188  According to Judge Pooler, the Status 
Disclosure was different because (1) it was “the least restrictive means to 
ensure that a woman is aware of whether or not a particular pregnancy 
services center has a licensed medical provider at the time that she first 
interacts with it” and (2) a pregnant woman required “prompt access to the 
type of care [sought].”189 
The third judge in the panel, Judge Wesley concurred in part and 
dissented in part.  He would have affirmed the Southern District in full and 
struck down the Status Disclosure as well.190  In a sharply worded partial 
dissent, he labeled Local Law 17 a “bureaucrat’s dream” with “a 
deliberately ambiguous set of standards guiding its application” because it 
was “irredeemably vague with respect to the definition of a pregnancy 
services center,” and he cautioned that it would give city officials “a blank 
check . . . to harass or threaten legitimate activity.”191 
Even though two of the three disclosure provisions were struck down, 
pro-life organizations across the nation reacted strongly to the Second 
Circuit’s decision, attributing the refusal to strike down the Status 
Disclosure as motivated by political concerns.192  With the help of 
prominent pro-life organizations such as the American Center for Law & 
Justice and the Alliance Defense Fund, the pregnancy services centers filed 
a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.  When the Supreme 
Court denied that petition in November 2014, the Second Circuit decision 
again found itself in the spotlight.193  During the case’s journey through the 
federal judicial system, it played a starring role in the often-contentious 
debate over the role of abortion in America. 
C.  United States v. Caronia 
The FDA plays a central role in reviewing the safety and efficacy of 
drugs before they may be sold to the public.  After a drug is FDA approved 
for any use, doctors may prescribe it for whatever uses they conclude, in 
their medical judgment, are appropriate for their patients.194  It is legal, 
commonplace, and often essential that drugs are prescribed on an off-label 
basis.  But for years it has been unclear what limitations the FDA may place 
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on the speech of pharmaceutical companies about the off-label uses of their 
drugs.  In United States v. Caronia,195 the Second Circuit made clear that, 
so long as what is said about off-label use of a drug is truthful and 
nonmisleading, the First Amendment protects it.196 
Alfred Caronia was a Special Sales Consultant of Orphan Medical, Inc., a 
pharmaceutical company that manufactured the drug Xyrem.197  The FDA 
had approved the drug for two uses for narcolepsy patients.198  Caronia, as 
part of his role in marketing Xyrem, urged doctors to prescribe it for other 
uses.199  He was charged and convicted of the crime of conspiring “to 
introduce a misbranded drug into interstate commerce” based on his efforts 
to persuade doctors to prescribe Xyrem for off-label uses.200  The 
government made repeated references to Caronia’s speech throughout the 
case, ultimately leading the court to reverse his conviction on the ground 
that he had been convicted, in violation of the First Amendment, for his off-
label promotion.  In reaching that conclusion, the court, in an opinion by 
Judge Chin, made a number of significant rulings.201 
The court relied heavily on the then-recent Supreme Court ruling in 
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,202 a case that, among other things, concluded 
that “[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of 
expression protected by the . . . First Amendment.”203  Applying, as the 
Court in Sorrell had, the test for commercial speech set forth in Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission,204 the court held that 
“the government’s construction” of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act (FDCA) “as prohibiting off-label promotion” could not withstand 
constitutional scrutiny since it did not directly advance any government 
interest to a material degree.205  Off-label use itself, the court observed, was 
not illegal, and “even if pharmaceutical manufacturers are barred from off-
label promotion, physicians can prescribe, and patients can use, drugs for 
off-label purposes.”206  Put another way, “[t]he government’s construction 
of the FDCA essentially legalizes the outcome—off-label use—but 
prohibits the free flow of information that would inform that outcome.”207 
Nor, the court concluded, were the government’s regulations narrowly 
drawn, as also required by Central Hudson.208  There were numerous 
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alternatives available to the government other than ones that threatened 
First Amendment rights.209  Those included guiding physicians and patients 
to distinguish between misleading and accurate information, developing 
warning or disclaimer systems or “safety tiers within the off-label market” 
or the like.210  “The government’s interests,” the court stated, “could be 
served equally well by more limited and targeted restrictions on speech.”211 
The court summed up its ruling this way:  “We conclude simply that the 
government cannot prosecute pharmaceutical manufacturers and their 
representatives under the FDCA for speech promoting the lawful, off-label 
use of an FDA-approved drug.”212 
The Second Circuit’s ruling “sent shockwaves through the 
pharmaceutical industry,”213 and left many in the industry optimistic that 
the ruling would give them greater freedom under the First Amendment to 
promote off-label uses for drugs, so long as they did so truthfully and in a 
nonmisleading manner.214  The optimism increased when, in August 2015, 
Judge Paul Engelmayer for the Southern District of New York granted 
Amarin Pharma, Inc.’s motion to preliminarily enjoin the FDA from 
prosecuting it for misbranding based on entirely accurate and 
nonmisleading speech about off-label use of its drug, a ruling later 
embodied in a final order agreed to by the parties and signed by Judge 
Engelmayer.215  Caronia no doubt represents a major step in providing 
pharmaceutical companies with broad First Amendment protection for their 
truthful and nonmisleading speech. 
VI.  SPEECH OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,216 the Supreme Court ruled, by a 5–4 vote, that 
the First Amendment offers no protection to a government employee for 
making statements “pursuant to their official duties” that lead to their 
dismissal, even if the statements relate to matters of public concern.217  
Later cases thus have focused on whether statements made by public 
employees were made by them in that capacity or as citizens.  In Matthews 
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v. City of New York,218 the Second Circuit addressed the question of how 
speech of a police officer to his commanding officers should be 
characterized where the officer took issue with an arrest quota policy.  
Reversing a district court decision to the contrary, the court concluded that 
the officer spoke as a citizen and that the First Amendment therefore 
protected his speech.219 
Officer Matthews maintained that supervisors in his precinct had 
implemented a quota system “mandating the number of arrests, summons, 
and stop-and-frisks that police officers must conduct.”220  He repeatedly 
reported the policy to several of his superiors and repeatedly took issue with 
it, arguing that the policy was, among other things, “having an adverse 
effect on the precinct’s relationship with the community.”221  As a result, 
Matthews claimed, he had been punished by being given punitive 
assignments, denied overtime, and given negative performance reviews; 
retaliation that he claimed violated the First Amendment.222 
The legal issue in the case was clear.  There was no doubt that the speech 
at issue related to matters of public concern.  But that had been true in 
Garcetti as well, a case in which a deputy district attorney, Richard 
Ceballos, had become persuaded that an affidavit submitted by his office in 
a criminal proceeding had contained significant inaccuracies, who 
repeatedly told his superiors that and recommended dismissal of the case, 
and who finally had been called to testify for the defense in the case.223  
After doing so, Ceballos claimed that he had been retaliated against by 
being relegated to a diminished position, given no promotions, and 
otherwise punished for his speech.224  In that context, the First Amendment 
had been held to afford him no protection because he had, the majority 
concluded, done so in his role as a government employee.225 
In Matthews, the court held that Garcetti was not controlling.226  Judge 
Walker’s opinion held that Matthews’s speech was not what he was 
“employed to do,” that the speech addressed a “precinct-wide policy” which 
was “neither part of his job description nor part of the practical reality of his 
everyday work.”227  When a public employee’s duties “do not involve 
formulating, implementing, or providing feedback on a policy that 
implicates a matter of public concern,” the court concluded, “he or she 
speaks as a citizen, not as a public employee.”228 
Garcetti itself was a controversial ruling, one that led the President of the 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees to 
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characterize it as having said to public employees, “[y]our conscience or 
your job.  You can’t have both.”229  Enforcement of it has been difficult 
because its results have often seemed morally dubious and at odds with the 
spirit, if not what the Supreme Court has held to be the required reading, of 
the First Amendment.  The reversal in Matthews, of a district court seeking 
to abide by Garcetti, followed earlier proceedings in the case.  Earlier, a 
different district court judge seeking to apply Garcetti had also dismissed 
Matthews’s claim and was subsequently reversed on the ground that 
discovery was necessary as to “the nature of the plaintiff’s job 
responsibilities, the nature of the speech, and the relationship between the 
two.”230  We can expect more cases and more conflict in this area. 
VII.  JOURNALIST PRIVILEGE 
The Second Circuit also has made noteworthy contributions to the case 
law regarding the First Amendment rights of journalists.  Gonzales v. 
National Broadcasting Co.231 is such a case, and, while its substance is 
itself noteworthy, the process by which it was reached also warrants 
attention.232 
In the case motorists brought a suit against a deputy sheriff for racially 
motivated stops and detentions.  The motorists sought to introduce video 
evidence of a similarly challenged stop of an NBC reporter that was also 
conducted by Deputy Pierce.233  The video had been recorded from a 
hidden camera on the reporter’s car, and several still images taken from it 
subsequently aired on a Dateline program regarding law enforcement 
misconduct.234  The motorists filed a nonparty subpoena to compel NBC to 
produce the entire hidden-camera footage and, in September of 1997, NBC 
was ordered by the Southern District of New York to produce the tape 
despite its claim of journalist privilege.235  After being held in contempt, 
NBC appealed. 
In September of 1998, the Second Circuit affirmed the Southern District 
of New York and ordered NBC to turn over the previously unreleased 
footage.236  The court, in a unanimous opinion written by Judge Barrington 
Parker, announced that “[o]ur holding today is that there is no journalists’ 
privilege for nonconfidential information.”237  Members of the press and 
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their attorneys expressed dismay at the holding and at the courts’s 
observation that the issue regarding nonconfidential information was one of 
first impression.  They maintained that it was long established that 
nonconfidential information was protected by the First Amendment and 
they had long resisted subpoenas on that ground.238 
The newly adopted stance was at odds with previous Second Circuit dicta  
in Von Bulow v. Von Bulow,239 a 1987 opinion penned by Senior Judge 
William Timbers in which the Second Circuit indicated that it, like other 
circuits that confronted the issue, would hold that nonconfidential 
information was protected by a qualified journalist-source privilege.240  
But, as the court in Gonzalez pointed out, the language from Von Bulow 
was nonbinding, with the actual holding of Von Bulow being that the 
reporter’s privilege did not apply where the journalist gathered the 
information for private use with no intent to ever publish it.241  The court 
was thus free to depart from Von Bulow’s recognition of a journalist 
privilege if it saw fit to do so.242 
On reconsideration, a unanimous three-judge panel withdrew the earlier 
opinion and announced a very different stance with respect to 
nonconfidential information:  it recognized the existence of the journalists’ 
privilege in the Second Circuit.243  Judge Pierre Leval, in an opinion joined 
by Judges Joseph McLaughlin and Arthur Spatt (both of whom had joined 
Judge William Timbers’s decision a year earlier), announced that “the 
qualified privilege protecting press materials from disclosures applies to 
nonconfidential as well as to confidential materials.”244  But he stressed that 
“the showing needed to overcome the privilege is less demanding than the 
showing required where confidential materials are sought.”245  Ultimately 
the Second Circuit upheld the initial result, requiring the journalist to turn 
over the tape, finding that the privilege was overcome because the plaintiffs 
showed that the outtakes were “likely relevant to a significant issue in the 
case, and [were] not reasonably obtainable from other available sources.”246  
The decision on reconsideration provided considerable protection for the 
press in an area of considerable controversy and in which the law had long 
been less than clear. 
CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit has played a major role in the development of First 
Amendment law.  From the days in which Learned Hand reigned 
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intellectually on the Second Circuit through current rulings, the court has 
assured that broad protections for freedom of expression were afforded.  
First Amendment arguments did not always prevail, and there is no reason 
to think they always should have.  But the court has always been receptive 
to them, and its decisions have reflected a high level of dedication to 
assuring that the communications capital of the nation remains at the 
forefront of defending the freedoms set forth in the First Amendment. 
